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Circular models of values and goals suggest that some motivational aims are consistent with each other,
some oppose each other, and others are orthogonal to each other. The present experiments tested this idea
explicitly by examining how value confrontation and priming methods influence values and value-
consistent behaviors throughout the entire value system. Experiment 1 revealed that change in 1 set of
social values causes motivationally compatible values to increase in importance, whereas motivationally
incompatible values decrease in importance and orthogonal values remain the same. Experiment 2 found
that priming security values reduced the better-than-average effect, but priming stimulation values
increased it. Similarly, Experiments 3 and 4 found that priming security values increased cleanliness and
decreased curiosity behaviors, whereas priming self-direction values decreased cleanliness and increased
curiosity behaviors. Experiment 5 found that priming achievement values increased success at puzzle
completion and decreased helpfulness to an experimenter, whereas priming with benevolence values
decreased success and increased helpfulness. These results highlight the importance of circular models
describing motivational interconnections between values and personal goals.
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Specific patterns of motivation interconnection have been de-
scribed in an influential model of social values (Schwartz, 1992)
and a more recent model of personal goals (Grouzet et al., 2005).
The model of values focuses on abstract ideals—such as freedom,
equality, helpfulness, and enjoying life—that people regard as
important guiding principles. The model of personal goals focuses
on aims and aspirations—such as self-acceptance, affiliation,
physical health, and popularity—that a person has. Despite their
slightly different foci, both models propose that there are “four
occasionally overlapping but sometimes conflictual motivational
systems that people must negotiate as they make their way through
life” (Grouzet et al., 2005, p. 813). In this article, we briefly review
these models and argue that their assumptions about motivational
interconnections can be useful for understanding basic mecha-
nisms in judgment and action. This idea is then illustrated in five
experiments that explore novel implications derived from one of
the models.
CIRCULAR PATTERNS IN VALUES AND
PERSONAL GOALS
Schwartz’s (1996) cross-cultural model of values indicates that
values are self-imposed criteria that balance between individual
needs, the coordination of social interaction, and group survival.
As values coordinate these concerns, they come to express and
serve 10 types of motivation: power, achievement, hedonism,
stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition,
conformity, and security (see Table 1 for more detail).1 More
important, Schwartz (1992) suggested that these 10 motives pos-
sess various conflicts and compatibilities. As shown in Figure 1,
these motivational interconnections can be modeled in a circular
structure. In this structure, values that express compatible motives
are adjacent to each other, whereas values that express conflicting
motives are opposite each other. The structure yields two dimen-
sions underlying four broad, higher order types of values, which
reflect motivational orientations that encompass the 10 lower order
motives. One dimension contrasts self-enhancement values, which
promote self-interest (e.g., wealth, ambition), with self-
transcendence values, which transcend personal interest to con-
sider the welfare of others (e.g., helpfulness, equality). The other
dimension contrasts conservation values, which protect the status
quo (e.g., family security, social order), with openness values,
1 The capacity of values to both organize and express goals is consistent
with evidence that values both direct and justify judgment and action,
depending on the context (Eiser, 1987; Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988).
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which follow intellectual and emotional pursuits in uncertain di-
rections (e.g., creativity, curiosity).
The circular model has been supported in studies of over 200
samples from more than 70 countries (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005).
Most of these studies analyzed participants’ responses to the
Schwartz (1992) Value Survey, which asks respondents to rate the
importance of 56 values (e.g., freedom) with a 9-point unipolar
scale. Results revealed that the values cohered well within each of
the 10 motivation types (e.g., security, benevolence), forming
reliable scales in aggregate measures of each motivational type.
More important, patterns of correlations between individual values
were consistent with the circular model. That is, adjacent values
tended to be positively correlated, and values at about 90 degrees
tended to have less positive or null correlations, whereas ratings of
opposing values tended to have null or negative relations, and the
ordering of the values in a two-dimensional map of value interre-
lations was consistent with the model (Schwartz, 1992). In addi-
tion, the model successfully predicts patterns in value-relevant
reasoning (Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003a, 2003b), the speed of
value rating (Pakizeh, Gebauer, & Maio, 2007), value–behavior
relations (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Garling, 1999; Judge & Bretz,
1992), and the relations between values and other constructs (Roc-
cas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995;
Schwartz, 1992). These correlations often follow a sinusoidal
wave form across the 10 values around the circle (e.g., Kasser,
Koestner, & Lekes, 2002). For instance, Sagiv and Schwartz
(1995) found that readiness for contact with a dominant outgroup
was positively related to self-direction and universalism values and
was negatively related to opposing conformity, tradition, and se-
curity values. Similarly, Roccas et al. (2002) found that the pattern
of correlations between values and several dimensions of person-
ality was consistent with the circular model, such that opposing
value domains tended to have opposite directions of correlation
with particular traits (e.g., extroversion).
It is interesting that Grouzet et al.’s (2005) analysis of personal
goals and aspirations yielded a similar set of results. This model
built on a theoretical distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
goals derived from self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000;
Kasser & Ryan, 1996). Intrinsic goals fulfill psychological needs
for relatedness, autonomy, and competence and are inherently
satisfying to pursue. In contrast, extrinsic goals focus on obtaining
rewards or social praise and tend to be less inherently satisfying.
Grouzet et al. proposed four basic intrinsic goals (self-acceptance,
affiliation, community feeling, and physical health) and three basic
extrinsic goals (financial success, image, and popularity). In addi-
tion, they suggested that these goals combine with four additional
goals (conformity, safety, hedonism, and spirituality) to yield two
dimensions of goal pursuit. One dimension ranges from intrinsic to
Table 1
Schwartz’s (1992) 10 Value Types and Their Principal Value Labels
Value type Definition Value labels
Power Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people
and resources
Social power, wealth, authority, preserving my public image
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence according
to social standards
Successful, ambitious, capable, influential
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself Pleasure, enjoying life
Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life A varied life, daring, an exciting life
Self-direction Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring Creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own
goals
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the
welfare of all
Broadminded, wisdom, a world of beauty, equality, unity
with nature, a world at peace, social justice, protecting the
environment
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with
whom one is in frequent personal contact
Honest, loyal, helpful, forgiving, responsible
Tradition Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas
that traditional culture or religion provide the self
Respect for tradition, humble, accepting my portion in life,
devout, moderate
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset
or harm others and violate social expectations or norms
Self-discipline, obedient, politeness, honoring of parents and
elders












































Figure 1. Schwartz’s (1992) circular model of social values.
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extrinsic goals, and the second dimension ranges from physical to
self-transcendent goals.
The hypothesized compatibilities and conflicts between per-
sonal goals in these higher order domains were supported by
Grouzet et al.’s (2005) research in 15 countries. This research
analyzed participants’ responses to an extended version of Kasser
and Ryan’s (1996) Aspiration Index, which asks respondents to
rate the importance of 57 “goals that you may have for the future”
(Grouzet et al., 2005, p. 803; e.g., “I will have a committed,
intimate relationship”) with a 9-point unipolar scale. Results re-
vealed patterns of correlations between personal goals that were
consistent with the circular model. That is, adjacent goals tended to
be positively correlated, whereas ratings of orthogonal goals
tended to exhibit null relations and opposing goals tended to
exhibit negative relations. Overall, the pattern of goal interrela-
tions was consistent with the two dimensions proposed by the
model.
Despite differences in the circular models’ dimensions (e.g.,
intrinsic–extrinsic vs. conservation–openness) and focus (i.e.,
broad social ideals vs. personal goals and aspirations), it is inter-
esting and important that both of these separate models have
yielded two dimensions of motivational conflict and compatibility.
Due to this common perspective, each model provides a powerful
conceptual basis for a priori predictions about the effects of chang-
ing specific values or personal goals and of priming specific values
or personal goals. The circular models indicate that each type of
intervention should have consequences that go beyond the effects
on the specific values or personal goals that have been changed or
primed, because of the impact of these interventions on underlying
motivational tensions that connect the values or personal goals.
That is, the models propose important motivational dynamics and
not merely a psychometric pattern. The potential importance of
these motivational processes is the basis for the present research.
To begin to reveal these processes, we have chosen to focus on
the latent motivational interconnections implied by Schwartz’s
(1992) model of values, which has received more direct tests thus
far. Specifically, the present research attempted to show how the
model has novel implications for understanding effects of value
change and effects of value priming. The discovery of systemic
effects in value change and value priming would provide a vital
first step toward revealing the importance of conflicts and com-
patibilities between basic motivations. Moreover, systemic effects
of value change and value priming would have important theoret-
ical and applied ramifications in their own right, as we describe
later in this article.
MOTIVATIONAL TENSIONS AND VALUE CHANGE
Consider first the potential effects of changing values. If values
are related through the motives that they serve, then changing a
value should cause changes throughout the whole system. Values
that serve the same motives as a promoted value should increase in
importance, whereas values that serve conflicting motives should
decrease in importance. For example, if the value of equality
expresses a universalist motive, as predicted by the circular model
of values, then any event that causes individuals to increase the
importance of equality should cause them to increase the impor-
tance of other values that similarly promote universalism (e.g., a
world at peace). At the same time, such an event should decrease
the importance of values (e.g., wealth) that express opposing
motives, such as power and achievement and have no effect on
values promoting orthogonal motives (e.g., politeness). To take a
different example, if the value of freedom expresses a self-
direction motive, as predicted by the circular model, then any
event that increases the importance of freedom should cause an
increase in the importance of other values that express the same
motive (e.g., creativity). In addition, there should be a decrease in
the importance of values (e.g., cleanliness) that express opposing
aims, such as conformity, and no effect on values serving orthog-
onal motives (e.g., achievement).
These predictions are powerful, because they involve wide-
ranging effects of value changes based on the notion of compati-
bilities and conflicts between underlying motives. The most rele-
vant research has used Rokeach’s (1973, 1975) well-known value
self-confrontation procedure to examine value change experimen-
tally. In this procedure, participants receive feedback that makes
them feel dissatisfied with the extent to which one of their values
fulfills their self-conceptions of competence or morality (Grube,
Mayton, & Ball-Rokeach, 1994; Rokeach, 1975), and they reduce
this self-dissatisfaction by changing their value priorities. Numer-
ous experiments have used the value self-confrontation procedure
to modify values, attitudes, and behavior that are often regarded as
being resistant to change (Chernoff & Davison, 1999; Devine,
Plant, & Buswell, 2000; Grube, Chen, Madden, & Morgan, 1995;
Grube et al., 1994; Schwartz & Inbar Saban, 1988). Thus, this
procedure has become an important intervention and object of
study (see Devine et al., 2000; Grube et al., 1994).
An important unresolved issue, however, is whether value self-
confrontation also causes people to change values other than those
targeted in the procedure. In the typical use of this paradigm,
individuals receive feedback emphasizing a deficiency in the ex-
tent to which they possess a specific value, and they respond by
increasing the importance of the “deficient” value. Rokeach (1973)
suggested that there should also be patterns of change in nontar-
geted values, but his model did not enable a priori predictions of
patterns of change. The circular models raise the possibility that
value self-confrontation may increase the importance of different
unmentioned values that serve the same underlying motive as does
the target value, decrease the importance of unmentioned values
that serve an opposing motive, and have no effect on the impor-
tance of unmentioned values that serve an orthogonal motive. This
focus on unmentioned values is crucial, because any systematic
effects on these values would provide a clear indication of a latent
motivational structure. If values reflect a motivational system, then
altering some of the values should promote some motives and
diminish the importance of others, causing predictable changes
across the values.
To our knowledge, this systemic implication of value change
has never been tested. This implication can be examined through
an experiment that asks participants to judge the importance of
diverse self-transcendence, self-enhancement, openness, and con-
servation values before and after a manipulation that varies which
of these types of values is targeted through a value self-
confrontation procedure. This procedure would enable direct tests
of four key predictions. First, value self-confrontation support for
a specific set of self-transcendence values should increase the
importance of other (different) self-transcendence values, decrease
the importance of self-enhancement values, and have no effect on
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openness and conservation values. Second, value self-
confrontation support for specific self-enhancement values should
increase the importance of other self-enhancement values, de-
crease the importance of self-transcendence values, and have no
effect on openness and conservation values. Third, value self-
confrontation support for specific openness values should increase
the importance of other openness values, decrease the importance
of conservation values, and have no effect on self-transcendence
and self-enhancement values. Fourth, value self-confrontation sup-
port for specific conservation values should increase the impor-
tance of other conservation values, decrease the importance of
openness values, and have no effect on self-transcendence and
self-enhancement values. Evidence supporting these four predic-
tions would be provocative because the paradigm entails numerous
changes in values that are not targeted by the manipulation. This
pattern would go far beyond the prior evidence demonstrating
changes in target values alone.
MOTIVATIONAL TENSIONS AND VALUE PRIMING
If the clear and complex pattern of value change is obtained, it
would be interesting to also examine the potential effects of merely
activating values from memory (rather than changing them).
Merely activating a motive-relevant concept from memory (i.e.,
priming) can increase people’s behavior in pursuit of the motive
(e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001;
Hertel & Kerr, 2001; Macrae & Johnston, 1998). For example,
Bargh et al. (2001) found that priming participants with compete,
succeed, and achieve caused them to better succeed at a subsequent
word search task than when primed with neutral terms. Similarly,
Macrae and Johnston (1998) found that participants who were
primed with helpfulness were more likely to offer aid to an
experimenter following a minor lab accident, as long as the aid was
easy to perform. In both experiments, the behaviors were chosen
on the assumption that they would affirm the primed constructs,
which also happen to be values described in Schwartz’s (1992)
model.
Yet, as noted by Bargh (2006), every promoted or primed
motive may have both excitatory and inhibitory effects on diverse
behaviors, and there is a need to understand which behaviors will
be affected by each motive. For example, we know that priming
money can decrease helpfulness (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). To
this point, however, research on priming has not identified a theory
that can be used to give an a priori justification for treating
different behaviors as outcomes that should be facilitated or in-
hibited by different primes. The application of the circular models
can move researchers beyond intuitive guesses about how partic-
ular motives might affect attitudes and behavior; instead, these
models provide a strong theoretical grounding for predicting which
behaviors and attitudes will be affected by which motives. Indeed,
Burgoyne and Lea (2006) noted that the effects of money on
(decreased) helping in the experiments by Vohs et al. (2006) is
consistent with Grouzet et al.’s (2005) evidence that money and a
sense of community are personal goals that serve opposing mo-
tives in their circular model. Of particular relevance to the present
research, this finding also fits the contrasting positions between the
values of wealth and helpfulness in Schwartz’s (1992) model of
values.
We therefore wished to test whether the circular model of values
successfully predicts diverse effects of value priming on action.
According to the circular model, priming values should activate
the compatibilities and conflicts within the whole system. The
interconnections between motives expressed by values should
cause the pursuit of values that serve the same motives to be
enhanced, whereas the pursuit of values that serve opposing mo-
tives should be thwarted and the pursuit of values that serve
orthogonal motives should be unaffected. Our research focused on
the two most important effects in this pattern—the potentially
significant effects on values serving compatible and opposite mo-
tives (i.e., ignoring the null effect prediction). For example, if a set
of values (e.g., successful, capable) expresses an achievement
motive, as predicted by the circular model, then any intervention
that activates these values should promote achievement behavior
(e.g., success at a puzzle), as in past findings (Bargh et al., 2001).
At the same time, such an intervention should decrease the per-
formance of behavior that serves opposing motives, such as be-
nevolence toward others, because of the reciprocal latent connec-
tion between these motives predicted by the model (see Figure 1).
According to the model, the activation of achievement-promoting
values would introduce a self-enhancing motivational focus that
subtracts from the motivational orientation underlying the oppos-
ing, benevolent values (e.g., helpfulness), which instead rely on a
motivational focus that transcends the self. This would make
people more likely to construe a subsequent behavioral opportu-
nity in terms of an achievement motive and less likely to construe
the behavior in terms of a benevolent motive.
The prior experiments examining the effects of priming abstract
motivational concepts have not enabled tests of such reciprocal
effects. Bargh et al. (2001) and Macrae and Johnston (1998),
among others (Hertel & Kerr, 2001; Karremans, 2007; Maio,
Olson, Allen, & Bernard, 2001), focused on the effects of primes
on intuitively compatible behaviors. Building on the circular
model of values, we can test not only whether value priming
increases the likelihood of performing a behavior that supports the
motive expressed by the values, but also whether the value primes
simultaneously decrease behavior that supports an opposing mo-
tivation. For example, do achievement value primes facilitate
success at word puzzles but inhibit the spontaneous assistance
offered to another? At the same time, do benevolence value primes
inhibit play at word puzzles but increase spontaneous assistance?
These questions involve modeling opposing effects of a single
prime on two behaviors and a more ambitious search for simulta-
neously opposing effects of different value primes on different
types of relevant behavior.
It would be ideal for an experiment to focus on the latter,
interaction hypothesis across the full range of values, if it were not
for difficulties in trying to design and assess relevant overt behav-
iors across multiple values without introducing fatigue, order ef-
fects, construal problems (e.g., assimilation vs. contrast), and
conflict among the behaviors. A more feasible approach is to
conduct a series of experiments, with each one showing the pre-
dicted facilitating and opposing effects along a different value
dimension. Together, such experiments would provide provocative
support for the motivational compatibilities and conflicts predicted
by the circular models. Such systemic effects would provide a
significant extension of our knowledge about the operation of
values in the elicitation of behavior.
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THE PRESENT STUDY
The extant models of compatibilities and conflicts between
motives facilitate predictions about systemic effects that have not
been explored in past research. In the present research we looked
for systemic effects of values, using both a manipulation of value
change (see Experiment 1) and manipulations of value priming
(see Experiments 2, 3, 4, and 5). We predicted that (a) changing
some specific values would both increase the importance of values
that serve the same or similar motives and decrease the importance
of values that serve opposing motives, and (b) priming some
specific values would cause participants to exhibit both more
behavior consistent with the primed values and less behavior
consistent with the opposed values.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tested whether a value self-confrontation manipula-
tion that promotes one set of values would cause changes in other
values. More specifically, we predicted that on the basis of Schwartz’s
(1992) theory about the motives served by values, any changes in
particular values would reverberate throughout the whole value sys-
tem, causing motivationally congruent values to increase in impor-
tance, motivationally opposing values to decrease in importance, and
motivationally orthogonal values to exhibit no change.
To test these hypotheses, we asked participants to rank the impor-
tance of diverse self-transcendence, self-enhancement, openness, and
conservation values before and after a manipulation that promoted the
importance of one of these types of values. This procedure entailed a
large-scale factorial design (i.e., five conditions and four value types)
with many participants, because the complex pattern of predictions
required good statistical power. For example, we expected that prior-
itizing self-transcendence values would increase the importance of
other self-transcendence values while decreasing the importance of
self-enhancement values. In contrast, prioritizing self-enhancement
values would increase the importance of other self-enhancement val-
ues while decreasing the importance of self-transcendence values. We
expected no changes in openness to change and conservation values
in the conditions that prioritized self-transcendence or self-
enhancement values (because these values are orthogonal to the
openness to change and conservation values).
Similar highly specific patterns were expected for the conditions
that prioritize openness and conservation values. We expected that
prioritizing openness values would increase the importance of
other openness values while decreasing the importance of conser-
vation values. In contrast, prioritizing conservation values would
increase the importance of other conservation values while de-
creasing the importance of openness values. We expected no
changes in self-transcendence and self-enhancement values in the
conditions that prioritized the openness or conservation values




In this study, 175 Cardiff University students (139 female, 36
male) participated for course credit. Data from 9 participants were
removed from the analyses because of suspicion.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either a control group or
one of four experimental groups. Participants were tested individ-
ually and told that the session included several tasks, which they
completed in the following order: a premanipulation measure of
value importance, a manipulation of value self-confrontation feed-
back, and a postmanipulation measure of value importance.2 Par-
ticipants were then probed for suspicion with a funnel-style de-
briefing and thanked for their participation.
Pretest Value Importance
In the first task, participants were given a list of 16 values from
the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey, with four values serving each
of the four higher order motivations: self-transcendence, self-
enhancement, openness, and conservation (see Figure 1). The
self-transcendence values were loyal, equality, helpful, and a
world at peace; the openness to change values were an exciting
life, a varied life, curious, and independent; the self-enhancement
values were ambitious, social power, social recognition, and suc-
cessful; and conservation values were detachment, moderate, po-
liteness, and respect for tradition. Each value was presented beside
a definition in parentheses (e.g., equality was defined as “equal
opportunity for all”). Participants were asked to rank the values on
the basis of their importance as guiding principles in their lives,
such that the most important value was ranked as 1 and the least
important value was ranked as 16.
Experimental Manipulation
Value-prioritizing conditions. In each value-prioritizing con-
dition, participants were shown (fictitious) average value rankings
of Cardiff University students for each of the 16 values that were
in the pretest measure of value importance. Participants were asked
to read these rankings and their own rankings. Values serving the
self-transcendence, openness to change, self-enhancement, or con-
servation motive were clearly prioritized in the average rankings
for each experimental group. The values in the prioritized moti-
vational domain were ranked from 1 to 4 (M  2.5). The mean
ranking for values from unrelated motivational domains was ran-
domly either 10 or 11, and the mean ranking for values serving the
opposing domain was 10.5.
Second, participants were asked to identify the four most highly
ranked values in the reference group’s ranking and to write the
names of the values in a predetermined column. Participants com-
pleted the same task for their own value ranking, and they were
asked to recognize the conceptual similarities and differences
between their value rankings and the reference group’s value
rankings.
2 Participants also completed a measure of satisfaction with pretest value
rankings before the postmanipulation measure of value importance. This
measure was included to complete the value self-confrontation paradigm,
which is supposed to induce a broad sense of value dissatisfaction
(Rokeach, 1973). Because this measure asked about satisfaction with the
whole set of value rankings, rather than the subset of prioritized values (as
studied in the 5  4 design), it was not appropriate for analysis within the
5  4 design.
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Third, participants were asked to read an explanation about the
first four preferred values of the reference group and about the
characteristics of people who rank those values as their most
preferred values. The explanation was based on Schwartz’s (1992)
descriptions of the value types. For example, in the self-
transcendence values condition, the explanation stated that
the average of the students’ value ranking shows that the most
important values to students at Cardiff University are Loyalty, Equal-
ity, Helpfulness, and A World at Peace. Past research demonstrated
that people who believe in these values always emphasize universal
human requirements, and are very interested in understanding, appre-
ciating, tolerating, and protecting the welfare of all close others and
people in other settings. Therefore, based on the average of students’
rankings, we can conclude that they have shown their concern for the
welfare of all human beings, even those whose way of life differs from
theirs.
To reinforce this aspect of the manipulation, we asked partici-
pants to write their own explanation of why students emphasized
the four values. Most participants simply paraphrased the expla-
nation that had been given to them.
Control condition. Participants in the control group were
asked to complete an unrelated task. Specifically, they were asked
to read a short passage about memory and to memorize 16 under-
lined terms (e.g., frontal lobe, verbal, short term, phonological).
After doing this task for 10 min, they were asked to read a new
version of the same passage, wherein the 16 terms had been
deleted. Participants were asked to insert the terms where they
belonged in the passage.
Posttest Value Importance
In the last task, participants were given another set of 16 values
from Schwartz’s (1992) Value Survey. These values were different
from the values used to represent each domain in the pretest
measure. Four values were presented from each higher order
domain. The four values that served self-transcendence motives
were forgiving, honest, social justice, and broad-minded; the four
values that served openness motives were creativity, daring, a
stimulating life, and choosing own goals; the four values that
served self-enhancement motives were authority, capable, influ-
ential, and wealth; and the four values that served conservation
motives were devout, honoring of parents and elders, social order,
and obedient. Participants were told that this set of values had not
yet been studied in students and were asked to rank the importance
of these values as guiding principles in their own lives, such that
the most important value was ranked 1 and the least important
value was ranked 16 (as in the pretest measure).
Funnel Debriefing
Finally, participants completed a funnel debriefing interview
similar to the debriefing approach used in past research (Bargh &
Chartrand, 2000; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003). This interview began
with global questions about the session (e.g., “Were there any
hypotheses that you thought we should, could, or would test?”) to
a more specific explanation of the experiment and pointed ques-
tions about their experience. Only 9 participants (out of 175)
indicated any amount of suspicion that we were looking at value
change during this debriefing. Most were puzzled with the notion
of looking at value change, because they knew that we had used
different values in the final measure of values.
Results and Discussion
Effects of Condition and Value Type
To examine the effects of the manipulation on changes in value
rankings from pretest to posttest, we submitted the algebraic dif-
ference between the pretest and posttest rankings (pretest minus
posttest) to a 5 (value prioritization: self-transcendence vs. open-
ness to change vs. self-enhancement vs. conservation vs. con-
trol)  4 (value type: self-transcendence vs. openness to change
vs. self-enhancement vs. conservation) mixed-model analysis of
variance (ANOVA), with repeated measures on the second factor
(see Rokeach, 1973, for details on this type of dependent measure).
The results indicated a main effect of value type, F(3, 483) 4.83,
p  .003, such that conservation values (M  0.22, SD  1.84)
underwent greater positive change in importance than did self-
enhancement values (M  –0.33, SD  2.03), t(165)  2.35,
p  .02, with the self-transcendence values (M  –0.04, SD 
1.94) and openness to change values (M  0.08, SD  1.85) in
between. As expected, the main effect of condition was not sig-
nificant, F(4, 161)  0.79, ns, suggesting that there was no net
increase or decrease in value importance between conditions.
More important, the results indicated a significant interaction
between value prioritization and value type, F(12, 483)  69.09,
p  .001. This interaction is depicted in Figure 2. To provide an
initial test of the circular model’s applicability to this interaction,
planned comparisons tested whether the values changed more
positively in the condition that prioritized the motive expressed by
the values than in the conditions that prioritized irrelevant motives
or no motives (control). In the analysis of each value type, these
planned comparisons were significant in the expected direction.
For example, participants in the self-transcendence prioritized
condition changed their self-transcendence values more positively
than did participants in the openness to change, conservation, and
control groups, t(640)  10.00, p  .001. We also conducted
planned comparisons that tested changes in values that served
opposing motives. These planned comparisons were also signifi-
cant in the expected direction. For example, participants in the
self-transcendence prioritized condition decreased the importance
of their self-enhancement values more than did participants in the
openness to change, conservation, and control groups, t(640) 
7.43, p  .001.
In the conditions that provided self-confrontation feedback priori-
tizing the other types of values, the results were again perfectly
consistent with the circular model. The self-enhancement condition
led to greater importance for self-enhancement values than in the
openness to change, conservation, and control conditions, t(640) 
11.58, p  .001, while causing lower importance for self-
transcendence values, t(640)  10.19, p  .001. Participants in the
openness to change condition changed their openness values more
positively than did participants in the self-transcendence, self-
enhancement, and control groups, t(640)  6.01, p  .001, and they
decreased the importance of their conservation values more than did
participants in the self-transcendence, self-enhancement, and control
groups, t(640)  7.85, p  .001. Finally, the conservation condition
led to greater importance for conservation values than in the self-
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transcendence, self-enhancement, and control conditions, t(640) 
10.95, p  .001, while causing lower importance for openness to
change values, t(640)  9.33, p  .001.
To provide a more rigorous test of the circular model’s appli-
cation to this interaction, we calculated the 16 possible paired
contrasts with the control condition in our 5  4 design. Eight of
these contrasts focused on changes in the self-transcendence and
self-enhancement prioritization conditions. For example, partici-
pants in the condition that prioritized self-transcendence values
changed their self-transcendence values (M  2.34, SD  0.21)
significantly more positively than did participants in the control
condition (M  –0.06, SD  .21), t(640)  8.08, p  .001, while
changing their self-enhancement values (M  2.60, SD  0.22)
more negatively than did participants in the control condition
(M  0.25, SD  0.23), t(640)  9.60, p  .001. As predicted,
participants in the self-transcendence condition did not change
their openness to change values (M  0.13, SD  0.20) or
conservation values (M  0.38, SD  0.20) significantly more or
less than did participants in the control condition (Ms  0.18 and
0.05, respectively; SDs  0.20), ts  1.08, ns. In addition, partic-
ipants in the self-enhancement condition changed their self-
enhancement values (M  2.33, SD  0.23) more positively than
did participants in the control condition, t(640)  8.69, p  .001,
while changing their self-transcendence values significantly more
negatively (M  2.49, SD  0.21), t(640)  8.18, p  .001. As
expected, participants in the self-enhancement condition did not
change their openness to change values (M  0.12, SD  0.20) or
conservation values (M  0.31, SD  0.20) significantly more
than did participants in the control condition (ts  1.22, ns).
The other eight contrasts focused on value changes in the
openness to change and conservation prioritization conditions.
Participants in the openness to change condition increased the
importance of their openness to change values (M  2.40, SD 
0.20) relative to participants in the control condition, t(640) 
7.47, p  .001, while decreasing the importance of their conser-
vation values (M  –1.76, SD  0.20) relative to the control
condition, t(640) 7.74, p .001. As expected, participants in the
openness to change condition did not change their self-
transcendence values (M  0.30, SD  0.21) or self-
enhancement values (M  0.49, SD  0.23) significantly more
than did participants in the control condition (ts  0.79, ns). In
addition, participants in the conservation condition increased the
importance of their conservation values (M  2.74, SD  0.20)
more than did participants in the control condition, t(640)  9.03,
p  .001, while decreasing the importance of their openness to
change values (M  2.17, SD  0.20), t(640)  7.39, p  .001.
As expected, participants in the conservation condition did not
change their self-transcendence values (M  0.21, SD  0.21) or
self-enhancement values (M  0.59, SD  0.23) significantly
more than did participants in the control condition (ts  1.16, ns).
Summary
The results of Experiment 1 provided the first evidence for sys-
temic change in values. Value self-confrontation support for targeted
values caused changes in different posttest values that served similar
and opposing motives. Values serving similar motives changed in the
same direction as the promoted value, whereas values serving oppos-
ing motives changed in the opposite direction. As expected, values
serving unrelated motives did not change. Thus, the pattern of value
change fits the circular model’s predictions about the compatibilities

























Figure 2. Experiment 1: Value change in each value prioritization condition for each type of value. Upward
changes reflect increases in value importance.
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Given this experiment’s novel evidence that patterns of value
change fit the circular model’s assumptions about motivational
interconnections, it is important to consider whether these moti-
vational relations can yield systemic patterns in value-relevant
behavior. Experiments 2 through 5 tested whether the activation of
a set of values increases behavior that supports the values and
decreases behavior that supports incongruent values. As noted in
the introduction, these experiments did not examine effects on
behaviors relevant to orthogonal values.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 examined the effects of priming stimulation and
tradition values. Schwartz’s (1992) circular model indicates that
stimulation values (e.g., a varied life, daring) drive a search for
arousal that is sensationally or affectively pleasant, whereas tradi-
tion values (e.g., humble, accepting one’s portion in life) respect
and accept the imposition of external limits. These two sets of
values belong to different and opposing categories of the higher
order value types: stimulation values are in the higher order
category of openness to change values, whereas tradition values
reside in the higher order category of conservation values. The
latent motivational conflict between these values should cause the
activation of stimulation values to decrease behavior that affirms
tradition values, whereas priming tradition values should of course
increase behavior that affirms these values.
To test this hypothesis, we examined the effect of priming these
types of values on the better-than-average effect (Alicke, Klotz,
Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995), which is the ten-
dency to express more superior evaluations of the self compared
with others. This effect is relevant to tradition values because
self-enhancement bias in general is fed by difficulties in recogniz-
ing one’s own place (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, &
Chatman, 2006) and limitations (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Tra-
dition values emphasize accepting such constraints in a manner
that diminishes the personal self. This emphasis is best character-
ized by the tradition values of humble, accepting my portion in life,
and moderate (see Table 1). People primed with these values
should experience a stronger motivation to be modest, causing a
lower better-than-average effect.
More novel, the circular model predicts that the motivational ori-
entation served by tradition values competes with the motivational
orientation served by stimulation values. Core examples of the latter
values are daring, a varied life, and an exciting life. These values
promote excitement, novelty, and challenge. By emphasizing personal
pursuits and satisfaction, they subtract from tradition values’ emphasis
on the connections between self and others (e.g., Streib, 1999). In-
deed, stimulation values are virtually adjacent to self-enhancement
values in the circular model (because Schwartz, 1992, indicates that
the intervening, hedonism values can be considered to be either
self-enhancement or openness to change values), and self-
enhancement values directly involve this self-inflation. It is therefore
plausible that stimulation values involve a motivational orientation
that is antithetical to the self-effacing mind-set that promotes modesty
in the better-than-average effect. People primed with these values
should experience less motivation to be modest, causing a higher
better-than-average effect.
However, the better-than-average effect may occur through two
different mechanisms: self-enhancement and denial (Paulhus,
2002). Self-enhancement is about promoting positive attributes,
and denial is about disavowing negative attributes (Paulhus &
Reid, 1991). Both mechanisms serve to maintain relatively high
levels of self-esteem (Alicke et al., 1995; Taylor & Lobel, 1989),
and it is conceivable that the tradition values lead to lower self-
enhancement or less denial or both. To examine these possibilities,
Experiment 2 included both positive and negative traits in the
measurement of the better-than-average effect.
Method
Participants
In this experiment, 116 Cardiff University undergraduate psy-
chology students (84 female, 32 male) participated for course
credit. Participants were tested in a group setting with a maximum
group size of 6. They were informed that there were several tasks
to complete. The experimenter presented the experimental manip-
ulation, followed by two measures that were irrelevant to the
better-than-average effect and then the task measuring the better-
than-average effect. Participants also completed a funnel debrief-
ing interview similar to the debriefing used in Experiment 1.
Experimental Manipulation
As in prior research (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Walther, 2001),
the priming task involved unscrambling 15 sentences containing
values or control items. The sentences included stimulation values
(e.g., stimulation, an exciting life, a varied life), tradition values (e.g.,
moderate, tradition, humble), or the names of furniture items (e.g.,
table, drawer, armchair).
Tradition Behavior
To examine the better-than-average effect with the same traits as
used in research by Alicke et al. (1995), we had participants rate the
extent to which they possessed 20 positive traits (e.g., intelligent,
respectful) and 20 negative traits (e.g., deceptive, disobedient) when
compared with an average student at the same university. Participants
responded to each trait on a scale from 1 (much less than average
university student) to 9 (much more than average university student).
The scores of the negative traits were reverse-scored so that a higher
value reflected a higher positive bias. There were two positive and
two negative traits on each page, and the 10 pages were given to the
participants in a randomized order.
Results and Discussion
We conducted a 3 (stimulation vs. tradition vs. control)  2 (trait
valence) 2 (gender) mixed-model ANOVA on participants’ ratings
of themselves relative to the average person.3 The results indicated a
main effect of trait valence, F(1, 103)  4.94, p  .03, such that
participants rated themselves as being more superior to the average
person on negative traits (M  115.86, SD  1.63) than on positive
traits (M  112.45, SD  1.57).
3 Our sample in this experiment was large enough to control for a
potential effect of gender on better-than-average scores, which was impor-
tant because of gender differences in self-effacement (e.g., Kitayama,
Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997).
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This effect was qualified by a significant interaction between the
value-priming manipulation and trait valence, F(2, 103)  3.17,
p  .05. To interpret this interaction, we examined the effects of the
value primes on the magnitude of the better-than-average effects for
the positive traits and for the negative traits (see Figure 3). There
were no significant differences in the magnitude of the better-than-
average effects for the positive traits (Ms  111.10, 112.45, and
113.79, in the tradition, control, and stimulation conditions, re-
spectively; ps .20). In contrast, the better-than-average effect for
the negative traits was significantly weaker after the tradition
values were primed (M  109.56, SD  2.83) than after the
control primes (M  116.62, SD  2.98), t(103)  2.97, p  .01,
and significantly stronger after the stimulation values were primed
(M  121.39, SD  2.67) than in the control condition, t(103) 
2.09, p  .05.
The results supported the hypothesis that priming tradition val-
ues causes more modesty in self-evaluations. This modesty was
significantly lowered when values that express an opposing motive
(stimulation) were activated. Nevertheless, these effects occurred
only when we examined personal ratings on negative traits but not
the ratings on positive traits. The negative trait ratings tap the
denial component of the better-than-average effect, whereas the
positive trait ratings tap the self-enhancement component of
the effect (Paulhus, 2002). Our results indicate that value primes
affect the extent to which the people deny negative attributes,
whereas their tendency to self-enhance is relatively robust and
resistant to interference. This observation converges with other
evidence for relatively robust self-enhancement effects (Alicke,
1985; Alicke et al., 1995): Self-enhancement may be too basic and
powerful to be influenced by a recent, brief priming event, whereas
the denial effect may be more multiply determined and therefore
amenable to influence. Future research is needed to discover why
the mechanism underpinning self-enhancement is more robust in
the face of brief value primes. This issue aside, the results clearly
supported our hypotheses that priming with tradition and stimula-
tion values causes opposing effects on modesty in self-evaluations,
congruent with the circular models.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 examined the effects of priming two different sets
of values: security values (e.g., social order, clean) and self-
direction values (e.g., creativity, curious). According to
Schwartz’s (1992) model of values, security values help to avoid
the threat of uncertainty and to conserve the existing order,
whereas self-direction values promote exploration and indepen-
dence. Like the tradition and stimulation values examined in
Experiment 2, security and self-direction values lie in opposing
positions on the dimension from conservation values to openness
to change values (see Figure 1). Thus, participants should demon-
strate more behavior that affirms the primed values than do par-
ticipants who are primed with the opposing value, with the control
group in between.
To examine this hypothesis, Experiment 3 tested whether the
activation of security values increases behavior that promotes
security, whereas the activation of self-direction values decreases
this behavior. Experiment 3 tested this prediction with a measure
of security-promoting behavior: cleanliness. As shown at the bot-
tom of Table 1, cleanliness is one of the security-promoting values
in Schwartz’s (1992) circular model. Cleanliness is a security-
promoting value because it contributes to safety, harmony with
others, and adherence to social norms. Thus, any task that primes
security-oriented values should also increase concern about clean-
liness.
More important, the circular model also predicts that this secu-
rity orientation is opposed by self-direction values, which empha-
size exploration and independence. Self-direction values entail a
creative, exploratory mind-set that is less concerned about prevail-
ing social standards. Creativity itself entails following novel di-
rections without rigid application of fixed rules and norms (Kuh-
nen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001). Thus, although this pursuit can
entail cleanliness (as in five-star restaurants and some art studios),
it involves a mind-set that can often be inimical to this behavior.
Indeed, people rate cleanliness and other security values as stron-
ger reflections of what they “ought to do” than of what they
“ideally would do,” whereas the opposite occurs for creativity and
other self-direction values (Rees & Maio, 2007). This competition
should cause self-direction value primes to reduce behavior that
affirms security values, such as cleanliness. Overall, then, we
expected security value primes to increase cleanliness, whereas
self-direction value primes should reduce cleanliness.
Method
Participants and Procedure
In this experiment, 58 Cardiff University undergraduate psy-
chology students (52 female, 6 male) participated for £3. Partici-
pants were tested individually and were informed that there were
several tasks to complete. They completed an experimental ma-
nipulation similar to the manipulation used in Experiment 2, ex-
cept that participants rearranged scrambled sentences including
self-direction values (e.g., choosing own goals, curiosity, free-
dom), security values (e.g., national security, social order, clean),
or the names of clothing items (e.g., skirt, shoes, boots).
Participants were then given a slightly leaky pen to complete the
remaining tasks (e.g., consumer preference ratings, problem solv-
















Figure 3. Experiment 2: Tradition behavior (modesty in the better-than-
average effect) for positive and negative traits in each value-priming
condition.
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a picture of dolphin, before coloring it with old, used crayons that
were messy and slightly sticky. Cleaning wipes and tissues were
provided next to crayons on the desk at which the participants were
seated for all of their tasks. We recorded the interval at which the
participants requested another pen or used the cleaning wipes as
the measure of cleanliness behavior, such that higher scores were
given for attempts to be clean in an earlier task. That is, partici-
pants received a score of 4 if they first used a new pen or the
cleaning wipes while doing the initial consumer preference task, a
score of 3 if the new pen or wipes were first used while doing the
drawing and coloring task, a score of 2 if participants did not
replace the pen and only used wipes at the end of the experiment,
and a score of 1 if the clean pen or wipes were not used at all.
Participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed with the
funnel debriefing procedure described in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
To examine the effects of the manipulation of priming condition
(self-direction vs. security vs. control) on cleanliness behavior, we
conducted a one-way ANOVA. The results revealed a main effect
of condition, F(2, 55)  4.35, p  .02, with participants in the
security condition (M  3.21, SD  0.92) requesting another pen
or using the cleaning wipes earlier than did participants in the
self-direction condition (M  2.30, SD  0.87), t(55)  –2.93,
p .01 (see Figure 4). A planned pairwise comparison revealed that
participants in the security condition tended to request another pen or
use the wipes earlier than did participants in the control condition
(M  2.84, SD  1.12), but this contrast did not reach conven-
tional levels of significance, t(55)  1.17, p  .24. In contrast,
participants primed with self-direction values delayed cleanliness
to a marginally greater extent than did participants in the control
prime condition, t(55)  1.74, p  .08. The direction of these
contrasts was again consistent with the predictions derived from
the circular model.
The results from Experiment 3 provided further evidence that
priming one value not only promotes behavior that fulfills the
motive expressed by the value, but it also decreases behavior
consistent with a motive expressed by opposing values. In this
case, participants’ cleanliness decreased after being primed with
self-direction values, relative to the effect of being primed with
security values. Although the main effect was significant and
consistent with our predictions, the specific comparisons with the
control condition did not reach conventional levels of significance.
Nonetheless, the tendency for the self-direction prime to decrease
cleanliness was reliable with a one-tailed test ( p  .04), which is
justified by our a priori hypotheses. This particular comparison is
more central to our predictions (than is the comparison between
the security prime and control) because of its relevance to the
latent motivation conflicts that we are attempting to illustrate.
Nonetheless, it was useful to conduct another experiment testing
our hypotheses regarding the security to self-direction dimension.
Experiment 4
By concentrating on a behavior that affirmed security values,
Experiment 3 examined only one half of the potential systemic
effect of priming self-direction and security values. The other half
of the systemic effect is that behavior promoting self-direction
values should increase following the activation of these values but
decrease after the activation of security values. Experiment 4
tested these predictions.
Experiment 4’s behavioral measure was based on the value of
curiosity, which is one of the self-direction values identified in
Schwartz’s (1992) circular model. We examined curiosity by giv-
ing participants an opportunity to request information about the
answers to diverse quiz questions. Curiosity about the answers
should be enhanced after the activation of curiosity and other
self-direction values, which explicitly promote an exploratory,
independent mind-set. The circular model predicts that this mind-
set is negated by the uncertainty-avoiding mind-set that underpins
security values, which are more concerned with stability and
avoidance of threat. Indeed, this view fits several major theoretical
perspectives proposing that social order, commitment to groups,
and positive group feeling serve partly to reduce psychological
uncertainty (Lawler, Thye, & Yoon, 2000). This view also fits the
frequent use of authoritarian belief scales (which tap prosecurity
motives; see Oesterreich, 2005) to help assess an aversion to
uncertainty (Sorrentino et al., 2008). Thus, a confluence of per-
spectives supports the hypothesis that the activation of security
values may reduce the strength of curiosity-driven behavior.
Method
Participants and Procedure
In this experiment, 60 Cardiff University undergraduate psy-
chology students (49 female, 11 male) participated for course
credit. Participants were tested either individually or in a group
with a maximum number of 5. They were informed that there were
several tasks to complete. These tasks included the experimental
manipulation and a measure of self-direction behavior. Then,
participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed with the
funnel debriefing procedure described in Experiment 1.
Experimental Manipulations
We attempted to conceptually replicate the effects obtained in
Experiments 2 and 3 by using a different priming task. Specifi-



















Figure 4. Experiment 3: Security behavior (cleanliness) in each value-
priming condition.
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Value-priming conditions. In each priming condition, partici-
pants were asked to complete a sequence of tasks. First, they were
given a table including values (and near-synonyms of the values)
from the primed value domain (e.g., self-direction) and the names
of some items of clothing (e.g., boots). The values were printed
adjacent to positive adjectives (e.g., happy, excellent, ideal, per-
fect, pretty), and the clothing items were printed adjacent to neutral
adverbs (e.g., normal, usual, typical, ordinary, common).4 The
values and items of clothing were located in a column labeled
Main Terms, and the positive and neutral adjectives were located
in an adjacent column labeled Adjectives.
Participants were asked to memorize main terms and their
adjectives and then, after 3 min, to recall and write down the main
terms and their adjacent adjectives. The experimenter asked par-
ticipants whether they noticed any meaningful categories of main
terms and their adjectives while trying to memorize them. The
experimenter explained that the main terms could be divided into
clothing and social concept categories and that the adjectives could
be divided into positive and neutral categories. Participants were
then given another set of clothing items, values, and adjectives
based on their categories to memorize, with the explanation that
the experimenter wished to see whether they could memorize more
terms after the categories were made known to them.
After 3 min, participants were again asked to recall and write
down the main terms and their adjectives. Participants in the
self-direction condition always received self-direction values (e.g.,
choosing own goals, curiosity, freedom) across the two memori-
zation tasks, whereas participants in the security condition always
received security values across the tasks (e.g., national security,
social order, clean). Participants in the control group went through
almost the same process as for the priming conditions, except that
for their categories they received names of colors instead of values.
Behavioral Measures
We measured the promotion of self-direction by examining
postmanipulation curiosity: the openness and eagerness to acquire
new information. Participants responded to 48 quiz questions
about various topics, including history, movies, sports, music,
science, geography, celebrities, politics, literature, myths, and leg-
ends. After each response, participants indicated whether they
knew the answer and whether they would like to receive further
information about the answer. To calculate curiosity from these
responses, we calculated the ratio of the number of questions each
participant wanted to know more about to the number of questions
for which they did not know the answer. Higher ratios thus
indicated higher levels of curiosity (independent of actual knowl-
edge).
Results and Discussion
To examine the effects of the priming manipulation (self-
direction vs. security vs. control) on value-consistent behaviors,
we conducted a one-way ANOVA. The results revealed a main
effect of condition on curiosity behavior, F(2, 57) 4.92, p .02,
with the self-direction condition (M  0.46, SD  0.28) showing
higher curiosity than did the security condition (M  0.24, SD 
0.18), t(57)  3.13, p  .01 (see Figure 5). Planned pairwise
contrasts with the control condition revealed that participants who
were primed with self-direction values tended to exhibit greater
curiosity than did participants in the control group (M  0.36,
SD  0.21), t(57)  1.35, p  .18, but this contrast did not reach
conventional levels of significance. In contrast, participants
primed with security values exhibited marginally less curiosity
than did participants in the control group, t(57)  1.78, p  .08.
The direction of these planned comparisons was consistent with
the predictions derived from the circular model.
The data from Experiment 4 provided novel evidence that
priming a set of values both promotes behavior that is consistent
with the values and decreases behavior consistent with opposing
values. In this case, participants’ curiosity decreased after being
primed with security values, relative to the effect of being primed
with self-direction values. As in Experiment 3, the main effect was
significant and consistent with our predictions, but the specific
comparisons with the control condition did not reach conventional
levels of significance. Nonetheless, the tendency for the security
prime to decrease curiosity was reliable with a one-tailed test ( p
.04), which is justified by our a priori hypotheses. This particular
comparison is more central to our predictions (than is the compar-
ison between the self-direction prime and control) because of its
relevance to the latent motivation conflicts that we are attempting
to illustrate.
Overall, the effects of the value primes on behavior that supports
opposing values were consistent across both of the experiments
examining self-direction and security values (Experiments 3 and
4). In addition, the nonsignificant effects of value-consistent prim-
ing (i.e., security increasing cleanliness and self-direction increas-
ing curiosity) should not be dismissed: These effect sizes were in
the predicted direction, small to moderate in magnitude (r .16 in
4 This pairing with positive adjectives was used because the chosen
values are all associated with high importance and positive feelings (Maio
& Olson, 1998; Schwartz, 1992). Thus, the pairing reflects the natural

















Figure 5. Experiment 4: Self-direction behavior (curiosity) in each value-
priming condition.
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Experiment 3, r  .18 in Experiment 4), and, to foreshadow,
value-consistent priming effects were reliable in Experiment 5 (as
in Experiment 2). Some weaker contrasts are to be expected across
any large set of experiments examining small-to-moderate effect
sizes (Cohen, 1988).
Experiment 5
Although the data from Experiments 2 through 4 supported our
predictions about the effects of value priming, they focused on
only one of the dimensions in the circular model of values.
Specifically, these experiments focused on the dimension from
openness to change values (stimulation values in Experiment 2;
self-direction values in Experiments 3 and 4) to conservation
values (tradition values in Experiment 2; security values in Exper-
iments 3 and 4). To more fully test the circular model’s assump-
tions about motivational interconnections, we should examine
the effects of priming values along the other value dimension,
from self-enhancement values to self-transcendence values (see
Figure 1).
Another limitation of the prior experiments is that they each
assessed only one behavior, which was meant to express one type
of value. Although we argued in the introduction that a consistent
pattern of results across experiments should be compelling, it
would nonetheless be more compelling to also show that the same
manipulation exerts a significantly different (opposing) impact on
a second behavior that expresses opposing values. This focus
would be similar to the design of Experiment 1, which found that
a manipulation of value change significantly interacted with the
type of value change being measured. In this case, the focus would
be on testing whether a manipulation of value priming interacts
with the type of behavior being measured.
To address these issues, Experiment 5 came back full-circle to
two motivational domains that have been used to demonstrate
classic priming effects described in the introduction (Bargh et al.,
2001; Macrae & Johnston, 1998). Specifically, we examined the
effect of priming achievement values (e.g., successful, capable)
and benevolence values (e.g., helpful, loyal) on behaviors that
promoted achievement and benevolence. These sets of values
reside within the self-enhancement (achievement) and self-
transcendence (benevolence) domains of the circular model. In
Schwartz’s (1992) model of value structure, the achievement and
benevolence value types are opposing: Benevolence values pre-
serve and enhance the welfare of others, whereas achievement
values emphasize personal success. Although these motives can be
compatible (e.g., when winning money for self and others in a
game), they tend to be implicitly regarded in opposition (Grouzet
et al., 2005; Pakizeh et al., 2007; Vohs et al., 2006). Consequently,
priming one value type may inhibit behavior that affirms the other
value type.
For example, the achievement behavior in this experiment in-
volved completing word puzzles, as in research conducted by
Bargh et al. (2001). These researchers found that success at this
task was enhanced by achievement priming. Although this task did
not directly compete with benevolent behavior (i.e., assisting oth-
ers) in our laboratory context, the circular model predicts that
priming benevolence would decrease success at the task because
the benevolence prime elicits a competing motivational orienta-
tion. Benevolence values correspond with a focus on the welfare of
others, and this outward focus is opposite in direction from the
inward, self-rewarding focus that energizes achievement values.
Thus, priming benevolence values may undermine the motiva-
tional orientation that drives success at the word puzzle task.
Similarly, the benevolence behavior in this experiment involved
freely volunteering to help the researcher complete an additional
experiment, as in research conducted by Maio et al. (2001). At the
university where this research was conducted, participants already
complete a high amount of experimental participation per year for
course credit (20 hr per year for 2 years), so there is little peda-
gogical benefit from additional participation without course credit.
Instead, there is evidence that volunteering for research in this
setting is motivated by the value of helpfulness (Maio et al., 2001).
Thus, a manipulation that activates this value and other benevolent
values should increase participants’ commitment to volunteering.
At the same time, a manipulation activating achievement values
should elicit a self-focused orientation that negates the self-
transcending orientation that underlies the willingness to volun-
teer. According to the circular model, the achievement orientation




In this experiment, 112 Cardiff University undergraduate psy-
chology students (67 female, 45 male) participated for £4. The data
from 5 participants were removed from the analysis because of
suspicion.
Participants were tested individually and were told that the
session included several tasks. First, they completed the experi-
mental manipulation, which employed the sorting task used in
Experiment 4. Next, participants completed a measure of achieve-
ment behavior and then a measure of benevolence behavior.5
Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and given a funnel
debriefing interview similar to that described in Experiment 1.
Experimental Manipulation
The priming manipulation was the same as in Experiment 4,
except that the value-priming conditions asked participants to sort
achievement values (e.g., ambitious, capable, successful) or be-
nevolence values (e.g., forgiving, helpful, honest) from adjectives
and items of furniture (e.g., chair, drawer, table). In the control
condition, participants sorted the names of food items (e.g., ham
sandwich, veggie pizza) from the adjectives and items of furniture.
Achievement Behavior
Similar to past research (Bargh et al., 2001), the measure of
achievement gave participants 5 min to complete a word search
task within a table of letters that included the names of British
5 These measures were separated by a measure of responses to a hypo-
thetical scenario involving achievement and a scenario involving benevo-
lence. Responses to these scenarios replicated the pattern obtained for the
behavioral measures but are not described because of our principal focus
on overt behavior.
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cities, items of furniture, and colors (total N  24). The total
number of detected words was recorded as the measure of achieve-
ment.
Benevolence Behavior
For the last dependent measure, the researcher asked partici-
pants whether they would be willing to take part voluntarily
(without payment) in some future research. He explained that he
needed to complete some more experiments but had no more
money in his departmental account. If they agreed to take part in
the research, they could choose an experiment lasting one of six
amounts of time: 10, 20, 40, 60, 90, or 120 min.
Results and Discussion
To examine the effects of the manipulation on value-consistent
behaviors, we conducted a 3 (value prime condition: achievement
vs. benevolence vs. control)  2 (behavior: achievement vs. be-
nevolent) mixed-model ANOVA, with repeated measures on the
second factor. Prior to conducting this analysis, we standardized
the achievement and benevolence behavior scores in order to make
their scale range compatible for inclusion in the same analysis
(enabling us to test for the Prime  Behavior interaction). The
results revealed a marginal main effect of condition, F(2, 104) 
2.47, p  .09, such that the benevolence condition tended to elicit
more achievement and benevolence behavior combined (M 
0.16, SD 0.66) than did the control condition (M –0.15, SD
0.53), t(69)  2.19, p  .03, with the achievement condition in
between (M  0.01, SD  0.57). The main effect of behavior
was nonsignificant, F(1, 104)  0.00, ns.
More important, the results indicated a significant Condition 
Behavior interaction, F(2, 104)  57.60, p  .001. Figure 6
depicts this interaction in terms of the raw, nontransformed vari-
ables (i.e., the number of words detected and the amount of time
volunteered). Examination of the interaction supported our predic-
tions: Participants exhibited more behavior supporting the motive
expressed by the primed values than did participants in the control
condition and in the condition that primed values expressing the
opposing motives. Specifically, participants in the achievement
condition exhibited more achievement behavior (M  0.71, SD 
0.98) than did participants in the control condition (M  –0.17,
SD 0.84), t(69) 4.54, p .001, and the benevolence condition
(M  –0.54, SD  0.74), t(70)  6.46, p  .001, whereas
participants in the benevolence condition exhibited more benevo-
lence behavior (M  0.85, SD  0.91) than did participants in the
control condition (M –0.13, SD 0.68), t(69) 5.05, p .001,
and the achievement condition (M  –0.73, SD  0.66), t(70) 
8.19, p  .001. Of particular interest, participants exhibited less
behavior supporting the motive opposed to the primed values than
did participants in the control conditions. For example, participants
in the achievement condition exhibited significantly less benevo-
lence behavior than did participants in the control condition,
t(69)  3.06, p  .001, and participants in the benevolence
condition exhibited marginally less achievement behavior than did
participants in the control condition, t(69)  1.88, p  .07.
Overall, the results indicated that the effects of value primes
depend on whether the behavior being assessed expresses the value
being primed or an opposing value. As expected, the significant
interaction between value prime and type of behavior revealed that
the effects of the value primes on each type of behavior went in
opposing directions. Activating achievement and benevolence val-
ues increased the likelihood of behavior affirming the motive
expressed by the values while decreasing the likelihood of behav-
ior affirming the motive expressed by the opposing values.
General Discussion
The results across five experiments indicated that changing or
priming any particular set of values has predictable implications
via their motivational interconnections with other values. Experi-
ment 1 revealed that the induction of changes in a set of values
caused increases in the importance of different values promoting
the same latent motivation while decreasing the importance of
different values that promote an opposing motive. Moreover,
changes in a set of values did not affect different values promoting
orthogonal motives. This systemic pattern provides an important
extension to the findings obtained by Rokeach (1973), who fo-








































Figure 6. Experiment 5: Achievement behavior (number of words de-
tected) and benevolent behavior (time volunteered) in each value-priming
condition, after converting back from the z scores used in the analysis.
Participants volunteered the following intervals of time: 1  10 min, 2 
20 min, 3  40 min, 4  60 min, 5  90 min, and 6  120 min.
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ments 2, 3, 4, and 5 revealed that priming a set of values increases
behavior that affirms the values while decreasing behavior that
affirms a set of opposing values. The consistent pattern across the
measures of actual behavior in the priming experiments provides
additional support for the notion that values map onto latent
motivational conflicts and compatibilities, as predicted by the
circular model of values (Schwartz, 1992). Together, the experi-
ments provide an important extension of prior studies that exam-
ined the effects of value priming on only value-congruent behavior
(e.g., Bargh et al., 2001; Macrae & Johnston, 1998) by revealing a
wider potential impact of values than has been revealed previously.
The results make clear that, when changing or priming values
with the purpose of altering value-relevant attitudes or behavior,
researchers should consider indirect effects of prioritized values on
nontargeted attitudes and behaviors. The importance of such indi-
rect effects has also been suggested in research on attitude change
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1981), but this suggestion has not been ac-
companied by a model that can predict the nature of these indirect
effects or methods of detecting indirect effects. The present re-
search reveals a basis for predicting indirect effects. That is, when
a procedure entails value change or mere value activation, indirect
effects can be predicted by considering the motivational intercon-
nections between values.
This evidence makes it compelling to also test whether indirect
effects of other constructs that are linked to motives, including
personal goals and aspirations, can be modeled in a similar way.
For instance, when a procedure entails change or activation of
personal goals, it should be useful to know the motivational
interconnections between them. Grouzet et al.’s (2005) model of
conflicts and compatibilities between personal goals provides the
most appropriate basis for examining the effects of latent motiva-
tional conflicts from personal goals. In theory, personal goal
change and priming should increase the importance and pursuit of
adjacent goals, diminish the importance and pursuit of opposing
goals, and have no effect on orthogonal goals. These results would
provide important support for the model’s claims about the moti-
vational interconnections between personal goals. If these results
occur, an intriguing and useful follow-up would examine the
extent to which the motivational interconnections between values
and between personal goals yield distinct contributions to behav-
ior. These aims were beyond the scope of the present investigation,
but our evidence provides a provocative basis for expecting that
these topics are worth investigating.
Limitations
Although the present research yielded consistent evidence for
systemic effects of values, several limitations of the designs should
be noted. For instance, Experiment 1 detected value change over a
short period of time after the value self-confrontation procedure.
Although the results provided a powerful indication of latent
motivational conflicts between different values, Rokeach’s (1975)
value self-confrontation procedure has previously elicited change
that persisted over 6 months. It would be interesting to discover the
duration of the present effects on different, nontargeted values. In
addition, there is a need for research examining procedures that are
less heavy-handed and more subtle than the value self-
confrontation procedure.
Another limitation is that the procedure in Experiment 1 as-
sessed changes in value rankings rather than changes in value
ratings. The iterative nature of value rankings means that upward
changes in one set of rankings forces downward changes in other
value rankings (Maio, Roese, Seligman, & Katz, 1996). This
iterative measurement cannot fully explain the results of Experi-
ment 1, because there was no significant downward value change
in any of the values that were orthogonal to the values prioritized
in the feedback: The change always occurred in the opposing value
domain. Nonetheless, convergence across different measurement
methods would provide a powerful extension of our findings.
Other limitations are varied. For instance, our participant sam-
ples were always United Kingdom undergraduates, thus limiting
the generalizability of the findings. In addition, we did not include
conditions that primed orthogonal values in the studies of value
priming (unlike Experiment 1’s examination of value change).
Results in these conditions should have been more or less the same
as those found in the control conditions, but it would be ideal to
test this prediction.
Also, in any studies of priming effects, the dependent measure
of behavior may reflect constructs other than those that were
primed (e.g., different goals, scripts). In our experiments, the
dependent measures of behavior could be plausibly linked to other
values beyond those that were primed. The lack of value-behavior
specificity makes it important that a consistent pattern was re-
vealed across experiments, but it is nonetheless important for
future research to investigate methods for more closely tuning the
measures of behavior to the values that are primed.
Mechanisms
Some interesting questions about the mechanisms that explain
the effects of value priming remain. Our research was guided by
the circular model’s prediction that values express specific moti-
vational orientations, which conflict with other specific motiva-
tional orientations. Extant evidence indicates that activation of a
motive affects the way in which we construe situations, such that
we are quicker to detect ways in which current actions, objects,
and people can be used to fulfill our motives (e.g., Ferguson &
Bargh, 2004; Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008). Consistent with this
evidence, the desire to achieve should make us construe a simple
word puzzle as an opportunity to gain personal success rather than
see it as merely a boring task or a chance to have fun. Thus, if the
activation of achievement values increases the desire for personal
success and reduces the concomitant desire to help others (as in
Experiment 5), then people who have been primed with achieve-
ment should be both more likely to see a puzzle as a chance to
succeed and less likely to construe a request to volunteer as a
chance to be helpful.
Although our behavioral measures consistently fit our assumed
mechanism, they cannot rule out all other possibilities. For in-
stance, Kruglanski et al. (2002) articulated how goals can be
arranged hierarchically, such that some goals are subsumed by
other goals. It is possible that the effects predicted by the circular
model of relations occur partly because values that serve opposing
goals are less likely to promote the same higher order goal than are
values that serve the same goal or an adjacent goal. For instance,
it may generally be more difficult to view the values wealth and
helpful as promoting the same goal than it is to view wealth and
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social power as promoting the same goal (e.g., achievement). This
mechanistic prediction is important because it is possible that the
ease of mapping onto higher order goals changes in different
contexts. To continue our example, prior recitation of a list of
philanthropists might make it easier to regard wealth and helpful-
ness as expressions of a compatible higher order goal (e.g., be-
nevolence) than would prior recitation of a list of corporate lead-
ers. Indeed, this speculation is consistent with other evidence
indicating that the effects of value activation on subsequent action
depend on the content of prior value instantiations (Maio, Hahn,
Frost, & Cheung, in press; Maio et al., 2001). In the long run,
research should evaluate multiple perspectives on the mechanisms
that mediate the effects of value priming.
Applied Implications
The present evidence offers a unique perspective on diverse
applied issues that are connected to values. For instance, many
theories suggest that conflict between values causes prejudice and
discrimination toward diverse groups, including people with dis-
abilities (Soder, 1990), homosexuals (Herek, 2000), obese people
(Crandall et al., 2001), and Blacks (Katz & Hass, 1988). The
attribution-value model of prejudice (Crandall et al., 2001; Cran-
dall & Martinez, 1996), the aversive racism model (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 1986, 2005), and the ambivalence model of prejudice
(Katz & Hass, 1988) all stress conflict between benevolence-
oriented and achievement-oriented cultural values as sources of
prejudice toward people or groups. The results of our experiments
complement these insights by revealing that behavior can be
affected not only by increasing the activation of values promoting
that behavior but also by decreasing the activation of opposing
values. Given these results, discrimination may be reduced either
by increasing the perceived importance of values promoting be-
nevolence or by decreasing the perceived importance of values
promoting achievement, because changes in either set of values
have reciprocal effects on the opposing values. Future research
should test whether such reciprocal effects do indeed affect prej-
udice and discrimination.
Other attitudes and behaviors may be made difficult because of
latent conflict between relevant values. People wish to protect the
environment, but actions often fail to match this value; people also
wish to be healthy but find themselves failing to eat right and
exercise (see Maio et al., 2007, for a review). In each case, people
may underestimate the effect of situational constraints on them, but
they may also underestimate competing motives. If the circular
model of values is correct in suggesting that protection of the
environment is viewed in a way that requires transcending one’s
own interests, then actions pursuing this value may seem subjec-
tively more difficult following activation of competing, self-
enhancing motives. This may occur even when there is no real
tension between the environmental behavior of interest and self-
enhancing motives. For instance, many energy-saving measures
are more cost-effective, even if they are automatically seen as an
altruistic sacrifice for the welfare of humanity. Our latent motiva-
tional assumptions may occasionally get in the way of reframing
behaviors to reflect a lack of conflict. Thus, these effects may be
a hindrance to campaigns that attempt to elicit behavioral change,
and future research could examine ways to address our latent
motivational assumptions.
Conclusion
This research presented important evidence that social values
express systemic relations between latent motivations. As a result,
changing or priming a particular value has predictable effects on
different values and on behaviors that express different values. The
precise pattern of these effects can be predicted with the circular
model of the motivational conflicts and compatibilities expressed
by values, but it would also be interesting to test whether similar
predictive power can be achieved by models of motivational
interconnections between personal goals and other concepts. Mod-
els of motivational interconnections provide a useful complement
to theory and research on the processes that guide action.
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